Satisficing by Turri, John
Satisficing
Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism
John Turri
Huron University College
john.turri@gmail.com
Classical  utilitarianism  is  a  consequentialist  moral  theory.  Con-
sequentialist  moral  theories  identify  some set  of  intrinsic  goods, 
and then define a right act exclusively in terms of how well an act 
promotes  those goods.  Classical  utilitarianism identifies  pleasure 
(or happiness) as the sole intrinsic good, and identifies a right act 
with an act that maximizes pleasure. In virtue of this, classical util-
itarianism is a form of  maximizing consequentialism. Maximizing 
theories say that only the best is good enough (or, in the case of ties, 
one of the best): an act that promotes anything less than the best 
outcome is morally wrong.
But what if promoting the best outcome requires you to sacri-
fice something of great significance to you? For example, what if it 
requires giving nearly all of your resources to charity, leaving you 
penurious? Maximizers say that it would be wrong for you  not to 
give the resources away. But many people think this is  obviously 
wrong, because it  is  too demanding.  Morality would not demand 
that much of you. This is known as the “demandingness objection” 
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to maximizing consequentialism (Scheffler 1982, Mulgan 2001).
Some consequentialists respond that morality really is that de-
manding (Shelly 1984). But many have looked for other ways out. 
One  way is  to  adopt  an  agent-relative  theory  of  goodness,  or  to 
weight bad consequences for the agent more heavily, so that moral-
ity never ends up requiring you to sacrifice so much. Another way is 
to  relinquish  maximizing  consequentialism  for  satisficing  con-
sequentialism (Slote 1985).
Satisficing consequentialism identifies a right act with one that 
promotes a good enough outcome, where good enough need not be 
optimal. This opens up the possibility – though it does not entail – 
that it is acceptable for you to not give away all, most, or even many 
of your resources. Donating $100 might be good enough.
One main challenge facing satisficers is to explain just when an 
outcome is  good enough (Bradley  2006).  Is  there some absolute 
minimum of goodness that  any act  must promote in order to be 
good enough, or is the threshold always determined relative to the 
quality of options available to you at the time? Different accounts of 
good  enough might  seem  more  or  less  plausible,  depending  on 
which theory of goodness we adopt (Hurka 1990).
The appeal of satisficing does not derive solely from its role in 
avoiding  objections  to  maximizing  consequentialism.  Common-
sense seems to recognize  a category of  actions that  moral  philo-
sophers call “supererogatory.” To perform a supererogatory act is to 
go “beyond the call of duty.” For example, it is not wrong for you to 
donate five, rather than fifty, percent of your net income to famine 
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relief. But it is still permissible for you to donate fifty percent. And 
donating  fifty  percent  seems obviously  better  than  donating  five 
percent. But since, according to commonsense, donating fifty per-
cent is  better but nevertheless  not required of you, it  seems that 
commonsense morality is committed to satisficing.
The main significance of satisficing to utilitarians, then, lies in 
the fact that it opens up further theoretical possibilities for develop-
ing a consequentialist  morality that can avoid certain compelling 
counterexamples  to  maximizing consequentialism,  and better  ac-
commodate commonsense moral categories and judgments.
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